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stern Europe is aiming at the achievement of a nified Single Market by 1992. Government interference and internal protectionism will gradually be reduced and all economic borders abolished, be they material, technical, or fiscal in nature. The Single European Act of 1987 and further agreements among Community Members culminating in the Maastricht accord of December 1991 have speeded up the process of economic integration in Europe and unleashed an avalanche of change sweeping before it all nationalistic self-interest which had hitherto prevented the EC from becoming a truly single market. By the end of 1992 European companies will share a home market potentially larger than any other in the free world. More recently, the creation of an economic zone in conjunction with EFTAsome of whose members have already applied for admission to the Community as full members -and the according by the Community of associate member status to Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, have increased this potential even further. And toward the end of the century, Western Europe will move into an Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) with a unified currency for core countries. Major institutional reforms are expected to accompany this process. This paper looks into a particularly important aspect of realising the Single Market: the future system of valueadded taxation (VAT) in Europe. This seemed to be a major obstacle for the integration process since it tends to affect not only the tax burden of EC citizens, but also the revenue collection of national governments. Although the basic choice has been made recently, the long-term destiny of VAT is still open.
Today, all member states of the European Community operate systems of VAT as the principal indirect tax on * Johann Wolfgang Goethe University, Frankfurt am Main, Germany. 70 goods and services. By zero-rating exports 1 and taxing imports at the rate applied to domestic sales, the present VAT system guarantees full tax neutrality for international trade: zero-rating of exports ensures that goods sold to another country bear no VAT of the origin country; the corresponding import tax will generally raise the price of imports to the consumer price level of the country of destination (destination principle). 2 Hence, French material sold in West Germany, for instance, bears the German (standard) VAT rate of 14 per cent, notthe French rate -which is 18.6 per cent.
In addition, this treatment of international trade ensures, for intra-Community fiscal relations, that revenue from VAT is assigned to that member state where goods are actually being consumed2 It should thus be stressed that the present regime realises the destination principle in a double sense: (i) as regards the allocation of tax burdens, or (formal) regional tax incidence; and (ii) as regards the allocation of tax revenue among the fiscs of member states, or regional fiscal assignment. This is important to keep in mind when discussing VAT reform proposals.
Currently, fiscal frontiers form an integral part of VAT systems. They are necessary to ascertain that zero-rated Zero-rating for VAT means that no output VAT is charged, and the VAT paid on inputs is all refunded.
2 Zero-ratingofexportsonlyappliestogoods;see, forinstance,w 1 of the German VAT law which reserves these concessions to "Ausfuhrlieferungen" (according to w 6 Gegenst&nde), and "Lohnveredelungen an Gegenst~inden". Services are generally taxed in the country of origin, hence the origin principle applies here.
3 For a review of the destination principle and its counterpart, the origin principle, seein Sijbren Cnossen, C.S. Shoup: Coordination of value-added taxes, in: S. C n o s s e n (ed. exports have in fact left the country. And, as goods enter the country, VAT has to be paid to the revenue authorities of the importing country which, again, requires fiscal controls. Without these controls, companies might use goods for untaxed sales on the domestic marketpretending to have exported them -or they might simply import goods tax-free.
The present VAT system is to be reformed for intraCommunity trade afterthe completion of the Single Market by 1993, when internal border posts will have been removed. First, it seems that without border controls, the EC would have to adopt the origin principle for its intraregional trade, for both regional tax incidence and fiscal assignment. Second, this system would seem to call for uniform tax rates throughout the EC-since differentiated rates would invite consumers to realise gains from tax arbitrage by shopping in low-tax countries -with the consumption in high-tax countries remaining free of additional charges. Third, it would also lead to a massive revirement of tax revenue to be re-assigned to member states governments horizontally.
Border Controls Unnecessary
As Cnossen 4 has pointed out, border controls are, however, not absolutely essential for fiscal neutrality to be achieved while retaining the destination principle. He discusses essentially two proposals in this context:
[] Deferred payment scheme. Under this scheme, exports are free of tax, and no import tax is levied at borders. In order to bring the value of the imported good to the domestic price level, the credit mechanism of VAT is relied upon, ensuring that the first taxable unit in the importing country implicitly pays the tax. This occurs because there is no offsetting credit for imported goods unless imports are declared. The recipient of the goodnot necessarily the importer himself -reports and computes the compensatory import tax, but may take credit for that tax at the same time. Since, as a rule, the import tax is not paid until the product is resold, import taxes are deferred, hence the name of the scheme. This system has been operating in the Benelux States under the name of PAS since 1966; it was also used in the UK until November 1984. s 
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A few remarks regarding this system may be appropriate: -The destination principle can only be realised for trading among firms liable for VAT. It cannot be applied to direct imports byconsumers. Thus, for direct imports the origin principle applies to both regional fiscal assignment and regional tax incidence.
-Documentation still has to be provided at customs posts in order to assure that tax-free exports have in fact left the country. The main advantage of the scheme seems to be that border formalities due to the levying of import VAT are reduced.
-Adopted at the Community level without border controls, the scheme seems to exhibit incentives to cheat on import-tax credits -through collusion between exporters and importers-where the tax rate of the importing country is higher than that of the exporting country. 6 In order to avoid this collusion, cumbersome administrative procedures would have to be set up. 7
It seems obvious that the deferred payment scheme would not be operational under the Single Market; however the method was proposed by the Commission in article 23 of the Sixth Directive. 8 [] Tax credit c/earance system. Under this scheme, exporters to other EC countries would pay full VAT to their own governments, i.e. exports are no longer zero-taxed. However, the importing firm would receive a tax credit for out-of-state taxes paid from its own fisc. Border tax adjustments are simply shifted to the account books of firms residing in importing member states. The EC-wide VAT system would thus work in the same way as national VAT systems do now; the EC would form a truly Single Market for VAT. 6 This incentive is negligible for the Benelux countries where tax ratesat least for Belgium and the Netherlands-are reasonably close together (17/19 per cent in Belgium, 18.5 per cent in the Netherlands, but 12 per cent in Luxembourg), and border controls continue to play a role for potential cross-checking. Nevertheless, there seem to be problems of tax fraud associated with PAS even in the Benelux states; cf. J.B. v a n der Zanden, B.J.M. Terra, op.cit., p. 136. 7 In discussing a recent French proposal for the adoption of PAS, Smith underlines the substantial administrative burden on both government and companies that is related to an extension of PAS to all EC member states. It would require exports to be accompanied by multiple copies of documents. Entitlement to zero-rate intra-EC exports would require proof of the exported good's having been subject to VAT in the country of destination, which could be effected by returning one of the documents, certified by the importer's tax office, to the exporter's tax authorities. Although border Controls would be eliminated under such a system, the transaction costs would be significantly higher on intra-EC transactions than those on purely domestic trade; this would effectively discriminate against trade in foreign goods. Cf. Stephen Smith : The European Community's priorities in tax policy, Institute for Fiscal Studies, Working Paper Series No. W90/2, London 1990, p. 15.
